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The Many Faces of Iqbal 
Rosalie Berger Levinson* 
ON MAY 18, 2009, THE SUPREME COURT HANDED DOWN Ashcroft~~ 
lqba/.1 Within a matter of months, literally thousands of federal district 
courts and appellate courts had cited to the case.2 It has been called the 
most significant Supreme Court decision in a decade for day-to-day 
litigation in federal courts.3 Justice Ginsburg lamented that the Court 
"messed up the federal rules" governing civillitigation.4 
It is now nineteen months since the decision-/qba/ is a toddler 
approaching the terrible twos. It is on record as one of the most cited 
Supreme Court cases in American history.s There are hundreds of law 
review articles, including several symposium issue , chaJlenging, ana-
lyzing, supporting, and critiquing lqbal.6 Bills have been introduced in 
• Rosalie Berger Levinson is the Phyllis & R1chard Duesenberg Professor of Law 
at Valparaiso Univen.ity School of Law. Since 1974, she has taught courses in Con-
stitutional Law, Federal Practice. and Civil Rights. She has also published numerous 
articles on c1vil rights. She has been a frequent lecturer for continuing legal education 
programs, including those sponsored by the Federal Judicial Center for federal judges, 
the Defense Research Institute, and the Practising U!w Institute. She has, in addition. 
team-taught courses with Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas in conjunction with the 
law school 's ~ummer program in England. 
I. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
2. Within the first six months after the Court's ruling there were more than 3,100 
citations to the decision by federal judges. Su Alleging Damage to Plaintiffs' Cases, 
Critrcs Seek to Ovmum Iqbal Rulmg, 78 U.S.L.W. 2304 (Nov. 24, 2009) !hereinafter 
Alleging Damage]. 
3. Adam Liptak, 9111 Case Could Bring Broad Shift on Ch·i/ Rights, THE NEW YoRK 
TIMES (July 20, 2009) http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07nllus/21bar.html. 
4 . /d. (citing JustJce Ginsburg's comments made to a group of federal judge!> in June 
2009). 
5. The Wall Street Journal quoted Tom Goldstein, founder of the SCafUS blog, 
as saying that/qbal would be the most cited case in the next decade. Jess Bravin. New 
Look at Elecuon Spending Looms in September, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2009. at AS, 
available at hup://online. wsj.com/article/S B 124640661014076677 html. As of January 
20 II , Iqbal had been c1ted 44,385 times; 17,254 times in cases; 24,308 times in plead-
ings. motions, and memoranda; 1,387 times in briefs; 1,395 times in secondary source!>; 
and 41 times in administrative decisions. From June 30, 2009, to March 17, 2010,/qbal 
was c1ted 512 times per month, making it the fourth most cited case per month. Adam N 
Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1293, 1357 (2010). 
6. See, e.g., Ray Worthy Campbell, Getting a Clue: Two Stage Complaint Pleading 
as a Solution to tire Conley-Iqbal Dilemma, 114 PENN S 1. L. REv. 1191 (20 I O)(seeking 
to reconcile the tension between the notice function normally attributed to Rule 8 and 
the plausibility rule which serves as a gatekeeper preventing frivolous and expen ive 
discovery); Gary S. Gildin, The Supreme Court's Legislati1·e Agenda to Free Go~·enr· 
ment from Accowuability for Constrtutional Deprivations, 114 PENN. ST L. Rn 1333 
(20 I 0) (situating Iqbal and Twombly in a line of cases excusing government entitie and 
530 THE URBAN LAWYER VoL. 43, No. 2 SPRING 2011 
Congress to override its rulings.' Various groups, including the American 
Bar Association,8 the U.S. Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee 
on Civil Rules,9 and the Federal Judicial Center,I0 have launched stud-
ies aimed at getting a handle on what the impact of Iqbal actually hao; 
been and what, if anything, should be done about it. Now that we have 
had nineteen months to mull over these questions, the AALS Section of 
Civil Rights thought it was time to revisit the many faces of Iqbal. 
public officiab from paying damages for injuries caused by their constitutional wrong-
doing); Edward A. Han nett, Taming Twombly, Eren After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 473 
(2010) (contending that the plausibility standard fits within the traditional insistence 
that factual inferences be reasonable and that it does not preclude di\covery during the 
pendency of the mot1on to dismiss); Arthur Miller, From Conley w Twombly to Iqbal: 
A Double Play on the Federal Rules ofCiril Procedure, 60 DuKL L.J. I (2010) (pre<.ent-
ing 2009 data from the Feder.~ I Judicial Center refuting the Supreme Court's as~umption 
that new pleading rules were nece\sary to address excessive di\Covery costs and coerced 
settlements); Martm H. Redish & Lee Epstem, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and the Future 
of Pleading in the Federal Courts: A Nonnati~·e and Empirical Analysis. Northwestern 
Public Research Paper No. I 0-16, (2008), a~·ailable at http://www.law.northwestem. 
edu/searlecenter/papers/Redish_ Epstein_final.pdf (arguing that Iqbal '>imply returned 
pleading rule~o to what the "notice pleading standard, was always mtended to be'' and 
that "plausibility" strikes the appropriate balance between the extremes of fact plead-
ing and "lax" pleading); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Clwnging Shape of Federal Civil 
Pretrial Practice: The Dtsparote Impact on Cil'il Rights and Employment Dtscrimma-
tion Ca~es, 158 U. PA. L. R1:.v. 517,570 (2010) (arguing that plaintiffs In civil rights 
and employment cases will be more likely to have thetr claims dismi,~ed and will be 
deterred from filing in federal courts); Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employ-
ment Discrimination, Seton Hall Public Research Paper No. 1657872, 2010 (discuss-
ing the tension between Iqbal and Swierkie11ic:z, which permitted a very permissive 
approach to pleading discrimination claims, and then providmg ups on how plaintifTs 
can survive a motion to dismis' even if it is assumed that Iqbal overruled Swierkie-
wicz); Suja A Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Emplo_W!Rnt Discrtminalion, 
2011 U. lu. L. Rn. (forthcoming 2011) (arguing, contrary to Profe. or Ep\tein, that 
the Iqbal standard is likely to be procedumlly revolutionary In employment cases and 
mark~ the effective death of S11ier~iell'icz); Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal Procedural 
Mismatches and CMI Rights uligation, 14 LEWIS & CLAllK L. Rl:.\. 157 (2010) (argu-
ing in a symposium piece on Iqbal that Iqbal cuts ofT dt<.covery and confer. too much 
discretion on federal judges to subjectively decide what are conclusory allegations, and 
lamentmg that the case will significantly decrease the enforcement and vindication of 
federal constitutional and civil rights where plaintiffs cannot know or plead essential 
information with particularity at the omset without the benefit of discovery). See also 
infra n(){e 60 citing arttcles addressing Iqbal's supervisory liability hold mg. 
7. In July 2009 a btll was inlroduced in the Senate entitled the l'.otice Pleading 
Restoration Act that would bar federal courts from dismissmg an) case except under 
the standards established in Conley. S. 1504, Ill th Con g. (2009). In November 2009, 
a simi lar measure was introduced in the House entitled the 2009 Open Acces~ to 
Courts Act. H.R. 4115, lllth Cong. (2009). See infra notes 32· 36 and accompanying 
text. 
8. At its February 2011 meeting the Amencan Bar A~soctation Task Force on Fed-
eral Pleading Standards intended to provide a report and draft resolution on Iqbal. See 
79 U.S.L.W. 1552 (Nov. 2, 2010). 
9 78 U.S.L.W. 2304 (Nov. 24, 2009). 
10. /d. 
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Iqbal arose as a con titutional tort Bivens 1 action seeking damages 
again t high ranking federal government official~ accused of adopting 
a post-9/11 policy of clas ifying Arab Muslim detainees as subjects of 
"high interest" because of their race, religion, or national origin, and 
then subjecting them to exceptionally harsh treatment. 12 Iqbal was a 
Pakistani immigrant who was rounded up during the 9/11 sweep for 
alleged immigration violations. 13 He was held for more than 150 days 
under a "hold until cleared" policy. 14 His complaint alleged that Attor-
ney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller were the 
architects of a purpo efully discriminatory plan. 15 He challenged the 
conditions of hi~ confinement in a maximum security facility where 
he was kicked, punched, dragged across the cell, held in solitary con-
finement, subjected to unnecessary and abusive strip- and body cavity 
searches, and refused his right to pray.16 Iqbal's complaint asserted that 
the policy of holding post-9/ll detainees of "high interest" in such 
extremely egregious conditions of confinement was planned and ap-
proved by both A hcroft and Mueller.17 In a highly controver ial five 
to four ruling, the Supreme Court rejected the Bivens constitutional 
tort action, laid to rest the Conley pleading rules, and created a new re-
strictive rule for upervisory liability to govern both Bivens and § 1983 
litigation. 1M 
As to the pleading requirement, the Court ruled that in order to survive 
a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " 19 
'Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 
mere conclu ory ~tatements, do not suffice."20 Justice Kennedy explained 
lhat while Rule 821 permits liberal pleading, "it does not unlock the doors 
II. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of NarcotJcs, 403 U.S. 
( 197 1 ). In thjs case the Court crafted a cause of action against federal agents for 
ear 'iolations of constitutional rights. /d. at392-95. For a de cnption of the demise of 
'·see Chemcrinsky, infra note 31. 
12 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (2009). 
13 /d.at 1943. 
4 !d. at 194344. 
5 /d. at 1944. 
/d. 
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944. 
ld. at 1948-49; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
/d. at 1949 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) 
that a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter to suggest that an 
...__.."' was made)). 
ld I citing Twombly. 550 U.S. at 555). 
fill R. Clv. P. 8. 
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of ctiscovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions."22 
In short, the Supreme Court's controversial 2007 1\vombly decision, 
which rejected conclusory allegations and mandated plausibility in an 
antitrust complaint, would apply to all civillitigation.23 
Iqbal then set out a new roadmap for federal district court judges. 
First, they must identify pleadings that "because they are no more than 
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth."24 Once these 
are excluded, the court, drawing "on its judicial experience and com-
mon sense," must determine whether the remaining well-pleaded factual 
a11egations plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.25 Plausibility, 
rather than possibility, is the key term-it appears twenty-two times in 
the majority opinion.26 
For Iqbal to survive a motion to dismiss, his complaint had to con-
tain facts plausibly showing that Ashcroft and Mueller personaJiy and 
purposefully adopted a policy of classifying 9/11 detainees as "of high 
interest" solely because of membership in a particular race, religion, or 
national origin. and not for a neutral, investigative reason.27 The Court 
concluded that the complaint failed to do so. In Justice Kennedy's view, 
Iqbal's complaint was riddled with "bare assertions" that were entitled 
to no weight in a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge.28 
Thus, judges are now authorized to label allegations "conclusory"-a 
highly manipulable standard.29 They are invited to look to their own "ex-
perience" and "common sense" in evaluating whether other "plausible" 
explanations for official action make more sense and warrant dismissal 
of a lawsuit prior to any discovery.30 The debate continues as to whether 
the Court merely clarified notice pleacting under Rule 8, or whether it 
22. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
23. !d. at 1953. 
24. ld. at 1949-50. 
25. Jd. at 1950-51. 
26. See Edward Brune4 The Substantive Origins of 'Plausible Pleading'-An Intro-
duction to the Symposium on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1 (2010) 
(describing the adverse effect the use of this mistaken word selection has had). 
27. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952. 
28. /d., at 1951. Justice Kennedy conceded that "when there are well-pleaded factual 
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plau-
sibly give rise to an entitlement to relief," but he insisted that legal conclusions "must 
be supported by factual allegations." !d. at 1950. 
29. Miller, supra note 6, at 22-23 (arguing that the plausibility standard invites 
subjective judgments, invades the jury's functions, and closes the courthouse doors to 
meritorious claims). 
30. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. Inviting judges to draw on their own "experience," 
rather than attempting to understand and appreciate the plaintiff's "experience" has 
generated significant criticism. See, e.g., Darrell A. H. Miller, Iqbal and Empathy, 78 
UMKC L. REv. 999, 1011-12 (2010). 
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essentially created a new rule. Many respected authorities, including 
Dean Chemerinsky, have commented that the model complaints found 
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would have to be dismissed 
under the new conclusory allegations/plausibility mandate.31 
Within months of the decision, bills were introduced in the House 
and Senate to overturn lqba/.32 Plaintiffs' lawyers lamented that the 
case was having a major impact-it was cited in more than 3,100 deci-
sions in the first six months, and data showed an increase in successful 
motions to dismiss in employment discrimination cases and civil rights 
actions more generally.33 The 2009 Open Access to Courts Act sought 
to restore the well-established Conley standard, that claims in federal 
court should presumptively go forward "unless it appears beyond doubt 
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that 
would entitle the plaintiff to relief."34 Opponents of the Act contended 
that Iqbal's impact had been highly exaggerated. Playing the terror-
ism card, they cautioned that a return to Conley would have devastat-
ing consequences. It would expose government officials to the burdens 
of defending against baseless civil litigation while simultaneously at-
tempting to protect us from terrorist attacks.35 They urged the Congress 
31. Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors: Transcript of the 2010 
Honorable James R. Browning Distinguished Lecture in Law, 71 MONT. L. REv. 285, 
290 (20 10); see also Stephen B. Burbank, Plausible Denial: Should Congress Overrule 
Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REv. PENNu MBRA 141 , 149 (2009) (lamenting the 
Court's reversion to the "facts" versus "conclusions" distinction, which had proved to 
be unworkable and which had led to the Rules' Advisory Committee's adoption of the 
current rules); Miller, supra note 6, at 25-26 (discussing the disagreement in the lower 
federal courts as to when allegations should be deemed "conclusory" and challenging 
the Court's mandate that judges distinguish "conclusions" from "facts"). 
32. SeeS. 1504, H.R. 4115, supra note 7. 
33. See Alleging Damage, supra note 2; see also Cecelia M. Assam, House Panel 
Delves Deeper into Access to Courts Question, 78 U.S.L.W. 2366, 2367 (Dec. 22, 
2009). 
34. Assam, supra note 33 (quoting Open Access to Courts Act of 2009: Hearing on 
H.R. 4115 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, I 11th Cong. 16 (2009) (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler)). 
35. See Senate Judiciary Hearing Probes Impacts of High Court Cases Curbing 
Court Access, 78 U.S.L.W. 2331-32 (Dec. 8, 2009) [hereinafter Senate Judiciary 
Hearing] (citing former Solicitor General Garre's suggestion that any effort to over-
ride Iqbal "would have potentially devastating consequences for the proper function-
ing of our government by exposing government officials to the burdens of defending 
against baseless civil litigation while attempting to protect the country from terrorist 
attacks and other threats"); see also Pamela Atkins, Twombly, Iqbal Introduce More 
Subjectivity to Rulings on Dismissal Motions, Judge Says, 78 U.S.L.W. 2667 (May 11, 
2010) (noting that several speakers at the ABA Litigation Section program in April 
2010 disagreed on the severity of the effect of Twombly and Iqbal, but expressed 
agreement that the pending bills in Congress were not the best way to address its 
problems). 
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and the Judicial Conference to monitor the situation, but not act rashly.36 
Ultimately, no new law was enacted. 
New data from the Federal Judicial Center confinns that Iqbal has had 
a dramatic effect In employment discrimination cases the rate at which 
motions to dismiss have been granted has increased by 5.3% and the rate 
of dismissal for other civil rights cases has increased by 9.1 %.37 Because 
civil rights cases often turn upon the defendant's state of mind, and be-
cause of the well-recognized informational asymmetry between plaintiffs 
and defendants,38 it is not surprising that civil rights litigants have been 
the big losers in the post-Iqbal world. Justice Kennedy did not admit 
that he was imposing a heightened pleading standard,39 but apparently 
many federal judges have interpreted the decision that way.40 Ironically, 
36. Senate Judiciary Hearing, supra note 35. In November 20 I 0 the Federal Judicial 
Center reported on its research on motions to dismiss filed post-lqbal and asserted that 
the research was incomplete and that "the time to act" on Jqbai/Twombly "has not yet 
come." Eileen Malloy, A National Survey of Current Case Law, 79 U.S.L.W. 1656, 
1657 (Nov. 23, 20 I 0) (statement of Professor Edward H. Cooper, Reporter, Civil Rules 
Advisory Comm.). 
37. Tom P. Taylor, Panelists Re-Exmnine Twombly and Iqbal: Game Changers, or 
Necessary Clarification?, 19 U.S.L.W. 1658 (Nov. 23, 2010) (discu~sing data provided 
by Federal Judicial Center). 
38. See, e.g., Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 759 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that a 
general allegation as to the prison warden's knowledge was sufficient at the pleading 
stage because "Mr. Santiago cannot know for certain what Warden Walls knew without 
discovery"). 
39. Ashcroft v. fqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). The Supreme Court has consis-
tently rejected judicial imposition of heightened pleading standards that are inconsistent 
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In fact, a few days after Twombly, the Court 
confirmed, in the context of an employment discrimination case, that "when ruling on 
a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual a.llega-
tions contained in the complaint" and cannot reject allegations of harm as "too conclu-
sory." Erickson v. Pard us, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (per curiam). Further, in 1\vombly, 
Justice Souter cited Swierkiewicz, a 2002 decision which rejected use of a heightened 
pleading standard that would require plaintiffs to plead "specific facts" establishing a 
prima facie case. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547; see Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 
U.S. 506, 512 (2002) ("[l]mposing the Court of Appeals' heightened pleading stan-
dard in employment discrimination cases conflicts with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
8(a)(2), which provides that a complaint must include only 'a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'"); see also Crawford-E) v. 
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) ("our cases demonstrate that questions regarding 
pleading, discovery, and summary judgment are most frequently and most effectively 
resolved either by the rulemaking process or the legislative process," and thus the court 
of appeals erred in adopting a heightened proof standard in actions that require proof of 
motive); Leathennan v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 
U.S. 163, 168 (1993) ("We think that it is impossible to square the 'heightened plead-
ing standard' applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case with the liberal system of ' notice 
pleading' set up by the Federal Rules."). 
40. See Janet Cecelia Walthall, Iqbal, Twombly Pleading Standards Hotly Debated 
b~ Conference Panelists, 78 U.S.L.W. 2782 (June 29, 2010) (quoting panelists at the 
\mencan Constitution Society's Annual Convention who disagreed as to whether 
these cases constituted a "sea change" or a "mere ripple" in practical tenns, but who 
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though, a recent Eleventh Circuit case relied on Iqbal to reject its previ-
ous use of a heightened pleading standard in qualified immunity cases.41 
The court acknowledged that its application of a heightened standard in 
§ 1983 qualified immunity issues was effectively overturned by the Iqbal 
Court.42 Plausibility, not heightened pleading, is the new buzz word. 
Professor AJex Reinert, a former law clerk for Justice Breyer, argued 
the Iqbal case before the Supreme Court. Since the decision, Professor 
Reinert has done extensive empirical research on Iqbal's impact on plead-
ing.43 In November 2010, he participated in a webinar panel discussion 
on Pleading in a Post-Twombly and Iqbal World: Where Things Stand.44 
He is thus eminently qualified to bring us up-to-date on this topic.4s 
The Second Face of Iqbal addressed by this panel is the Court's rul-
ing on supervisory liability. Defendants Ashcroft and Mueller conceded 
that they could be held personally liable if they knew of and yet acted 
with deliberate indifference to their subordinates' use of discriminatory 
criteria.46 The Supreme Court, however, rejected the argument that "a u-
pervisor's mere knowledge of his subordinate's discriminatory purpose 
amounts to the supervisor's (sic) violating the Constitution."47 The Court 
reasoned that in both Bivens and § 1983 actions "the term 'supervi ory 
liability' is a misnomer" because government officials may only be held 
liable for their own misconduct 48 Because Iqbal claimed invidious dis-
crimination in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments, his complaint 
had to allege facts establi hing that A hcroft and Mueller themselves en-
gaged in purposeful discrimination, not just that they had knowledge of 
and acquiesced in the discriminatory animus of their subordinates.411 
agreed that "there is lots of confusion among judge who themselves are saying thi is 
a sea change"). A few circuits have suggested that the liberal pleading rule set forth in 
Swierki~icz has been repudiated by Twombly and Iqbal. See Karen M. Blum, Section 
/983 Litigation: PoJt-Pearson and PoJt-lqbal, 26 TOURO L. REV. 433, 454-56 (2010) 
(citing cases from the Tlurd and Fourth Circuits); Jee aiJo Swanson v. Citibank NA., 
614 F.3d 400,403-04 (7th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging that federal courts are "sti ll strug-
gling" with the question of how high the Supreme Court meant to set the pleading bar, 
but cautioning that the plausibility requirement "does not imply that the district court 
should decide whose ver ion to believe, or which version is more likely than not"). 
41. Randall v. Scott, 610 F. 3d 70 I, 710 (11th Cir. 20 I 0). 
42. !d. at 707-10 
43. See Alexander A. Reinert, The CoJIJ of Heightened Pleading, 861No. L.J. 119, 
120 (201 1) (finding no correlation between a complaint' merit and its factual detail). 
44. See Taylor, supra note 37 (discussing Reinert's contribution to webinat). 
45. Alex Reinert, The Impact of Ashcroft v. Iqbal on Pleading, 43 URB. LAW. 559 
(2011). 
46. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
47. /d. at 1949. 
48. /d. 
49. /d. at 1948; see also Alex Reinert, Procedural Barriers to Civil R1ghts Litigation 
and the 11/w;ory Promise of Equity. 18 UMKC L. REv. 931, 940 (20 I 0) (que tioning 
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Iqbal pleaded in his complaint that the defendants "'knew of, con-
doned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject lhim]' to harsh 
conditions of confinement 'as a matter of policy, solely on account of 
[his] religion, race, and/or national origin.'"~ He alleged that "A hcroft 
was the 'principal architect'" of this invidiously di criminatory policy 
and "that Mueller was 'instrumental' in adopting and executing it."51 But 
the Court detennined that these were "bare assertions" that amounted 
to "nothing more than a 'fonnulaic recitation of the elements' of a con-
stitutional discrimination claim."52 They were "conclusory'' and thus 
not entitJed to an assumption of truth. 53 Justice Kennedy as erted that 
Iqbal's "complaint does not contain any factual allegation sufficient to 
plausibly suggest petitioners' discriminatol") state of mind."54 
The dissent lamented the majority's rejection of the prevaHing knowl-
edge/acquie~cence standard for supervisory liability.55 Justice Souter 
explained, "Lest there be any mistake, in these word~ the majority is 
not narrowing the scope of supervisory liability; it i eliminating Bivens 
supervisory liability entirely"~-and this applied to § 1983 as well.57 
Because the defendants conceded that they could be held liable under a 
knowledge/acquiescence theory and challenged only use of a construc-
tive notice theory, the issue was not even briefed.58 Rather, the Court 
sua sponte decided to restrict the scope of supervi ory liability for alJ 
civil rights litigants.59 
why categori7ing based on race does not satisfy lhe equal protection standard without 
further evidence of "animu!."). 
50. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
5 I. /d. 
52. /d. (quoting Bell Atlanuc Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 
53. /d. at 1941. 
54. /d. at 1952. 
55. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
56. /d. Justice Souter proceeded to list the various te tl. for 'upervisory liability es-
tablished m the appellate coum. including con~tructive knowledge, gro s negligence, 
and recklessnes in supervismg . ubordinate . /d. at 1958 (Souter, J , dissenung). 
57. /d. at 1948 ("Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bi~·ens and§ 1983 
suits, a plaintiff must plead lhat each Government-official defendant. through the of-
ficial's own individual act•ons, has violated the Con~titution."). 
58. The cert question before lhe Court was whether liability could be imposed on a 
theory of constructive versus actual knowledge. Petition for Wnt of Ceruoran, Iqbal, 
129 S. Ct. 1937 (07-1 0 I 5). Specifically, the Second Question Presented reads "Whether 
a cabinet-level officer or olher high-ranking official may be held personally liable for 
the allegedly unconstitutional acts of subordinate officials on the ground that, as high 
level supervisors, they had constructive notice of lhe discrimination allegedly carried 
out by such subordinate officials." /d. 
59. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948. 
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A with the pleading deci ion, there is considerable disagreement a 
to the breadth and meaning of Iqbal' ruling on upervisory liability.60 
Some courts have held that its re trictive mandate of "purpo eful di -
crimination·· on the part of the upervisor applie onl} where the un-
derlying con titutional violation impo e uch a tandard- namely in 
equal protection ca e .b1 Where the underlying con. titutional rights 
violation mandate only "objective unrea onablenes ." a in Fourth 
Amendment claim , or deliberate indifference, as in Eighth Amend-
ment or ub tantive due process ca e involving arre tee and detain-
ee , factual allegation need only "piau ibly" ugge t thi less culpable 
tate of mind.62 
Karen Blum, Profe or and As ociate Dean at Suffolk, has written 
and lectured widely on thi topic.63 Profe or Blum advocate a unified 
theory of liability for upervi ors who fai l to train, creen, or supervise 
tho e who commit con titutional violation . For years, he has been a 
key peakcr on 1983 i ue. for the Federal Judicial Center. She i an 
expert in municipal Liability and he co-authors a treati e entitled Police 
Misconduct, La\'-' and Litigation. 
Our program will conclude with Erwin Chemerinsky, Founding Dean 
and Di tingui hed Profe or of Law at the University of California, Ir-
60. See, ~.g. , Kit Kinports, Iqbal and Sup~n·isory Immunity, 114 PE N. S 1. L. Rr.v. 
1291 (20 I 0) (challenging the Coun' ' 'misguided as umption that the doctrine of super-
visory liability i!> indi tingui hable from re pondeat superior"); Sheldon Nahmod, Con-
stirutional Tons, 01er-Deterrenu and Supen·isory Uabilin• after Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. RFv. 279 (2010) (agreeing that the state of mind nece~'ary to upport super-
visory liabi lity hould be ba.<,ed on the particular con titutional violation a ened, but 
di. agreeing that the constitutional approach will improve the over-deterrence problem 
of§ 1983). 
61. See. ~.g., Dodd.., v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1197- 99 ( lOth Cir. 2010) (noting 
that at lea t the inth Circuit has read Iqbal to mandate "purpo~" only in case of al-
leged rac ial di crimination by governmental offic1al ). The Eighth Circuit ha.s uo;ed the 
le s rigorou. deliberate indifference tandard in case alleging fai lure to train. screen, or 
protect. See Whitson v. Stone Cnty. Jail. 602 E3d 920, 927- 28 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that a claim could proceed again 'It upervi ors for failing to protect plaintiff from sexual 
a!>sauh by male pri~oner if upervi~ors personally displayed deliberate indifference to 
the ri k that plaintiff \\-Ould be assaulted by other inmate ); Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 
993, 1001-02 ( th Cir. 2010) (holding that Iqbal mandates that a government official 
mu t, through h1~ own individual act , have violated the ConstitutiOn, but that liability 
can arise from a fai lure to supervise and train detainee where there is evidence of notice 
regardmg a pattern of uncon titutional aCL'> committed by subordinates. deliberate in -
d.itTerence or tacit authoriLation of the off en ive acts, fai lure to take :.ufficient remedial 
action, and evidence that the fa ilure proximately cauJ>ed the injury). 
62. Su Nahmod, supra note 60, at 296-98; see also Blum, supra note 40, at461. 
63. See, e.g., Blum, .wpra note 40; Karen M. Blum, Supervisory Uabillrv aftu Iqbal: 
Mi!.understood But Not Misnnmed, 43 URR. LAW. 541 (20 II ). 
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vine Law School. Dean Chemerinsky's treatise on federal courts is well 
respected and widely used. He has also authored a textbook and treatise 
on Constitutional Law and over a hundred law review articles. In addi-
tion to being a prolific writer, he is a frequent lecturer on constitutional 
law, civil rights, and the Supreme Court. In 2006 he filed a Bivens action 
on behalf of former CIA agent Valerie Plame.64 
Finally, I want to briefly mention a fourth issue lurking in the back-
ground of the Iqbal case, namely, prosecutorial immunity. Ashcroft and 
Mueller presented their case as a qualified immunity case.6s This was 
a key topic during oral argument where Justice Scalia asserted that the 
ability of the Attorney General of the United States and the Director 
of the FBI to do their jobs without having to litigate personal liability 
should not "be dependent upon the discretionary decision of a single dis-
trictjudge."66 Iqbal involved the hlghest ranking officials-cabinet-level 
policymakers responding to the national threat of 9/11.67 The Supreme 
Court has frequently stated, and it reiterated in Iqbal, that the substan-
tive policy behind its immunity doctrine demands a mechanism for swift 
exit from "disruptive" discovery and other distractions of a lawsuit.68 
The Court in Iqbal never reached the qualified immunity issue-it 
found a swift exit mechanism in its pleading and supervi ory liability 
rulings. The former Attorney General, however, faces liability in an-
other post-9/11 case. On October 18, 2010, the Supreme Court granted 
review in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd.69 John Ashcroft seeks absolute or, at mini-
mum, qualified immunity from claims alleging that, when be detained 
al-Kidd as a material witness, it was actually for the purpose of inves-
tigating al-Kidd's role in terrorist activities, or preemptively detaining 
hlm.70 The complaint alleged that Attorney General Ashcroft devel-
oped, implemented, and set in motion, a policy of using the federal ma-
terial witness statute pretextually to arrest and detain terrorism suspects 
64. See Chemerinsky, supra note 31 (discussing his representation of Valerie Plame). 
Dean Chemerinsky's remarks are not republished here. 
65. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942. 
66. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-5, 35-36, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 
07-1015) (comment of Justice Scalia). 
67. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1956. 
68. !d. at 1953-54; see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816-17 (1982) 
(recognizing "the general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial-distraction 
of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deter-
rence of able people from public service"). 
69. ai-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 415 
(2010). 
70. /d. at 958, 964. 
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for whom there was in ufficient evidence of probable cau e to arrest 
on criminal charges in violation of the Fourth Amendment.71 Thus, the 
Supreme Court is poised to again take up difficult question about the 
parameter of civil liability for high-profile figures, particularly during 
a national ecurity cri is that appears to have no end date. 
71 . /d. at 952- 53. 
